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The Regulation of Gestation: A Call for More 
Complete State Statutory Regulation of 
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts  
Amanda M. Herman* 
In 2006, Angelia Robinson agreed to act as a gestational 
surrogate and carry a pregnancy for her brother, Donald 
Hollingsworth, and his same-sex spouse, Sean.1 Robinson became 
pregnant and gave birth to twin girls, who were genetically 
related to Sean and an anonymous egg donor.2 Five months after 
giving birth, Robinson filed a lawsuit to gain physical and legal 
custody of the twins.3 Despite not being genetically related to the 
twins, a superior court judge ruled that Robinson was the legal 
mother of the children.4 After a five-year-long court battle, full 
custody was awarded to the biological father, Sean, but Robinson 
maintained parental visitation rights.5  
Gestational surrogacy arrangements have become 
increasingly common in recent years as they provide a way for 
infertile couples to have children.6 However, as the example 
above illustrates, these agreements have the potential to end 
negatively, often in prolonged litigation. States have approached 
the issue of gestational surrogacy in varying ways, with no 
uniformity amongst the many approaches.7 Without clear and 
comprehensive guidelines for gestational surrogacy 
arrangements, individuals will be left without guidance in 
creating these contracts, which will ultimately lead to the courts 
 
 * JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2015; BA, California 
Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, March 2012. I would like to thank 
Professor Marisa Cianciarulo for her guidance throughout the writing process, the 
Chapman Law Review staff for their comments and suggestions, and my family for their 
unwavering support.  
 1 Stephanie Saul, New Jersey Judge Calls Surrogate Legal Mother of Twins , N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31surrogate.html?_r=1&. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Ted Sherman, N.J. Gay Couple Fight for Custody of Twin 5-Year-Old Girls, 
NJ.COM (Dec. 20, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/12/nj_gay_coup 
le_fight_for_custod.html.  
 6 See infra Part I. 
 7 See infra Part I.  
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having to decide who is legally responsible for the children born 
of these agreements. 
Without federal guidance, states have been left to formulate 
their own approaches for permitting, enforcing, and regulating 
gestational surrogacy agreements. This has led to a complete 
lack of uniformity among the states, with some expressly 
prohibiting these agreements8 and others failing to address this 
issue at all.9 The District of Columbia has even gone so far as to 
criminalize surrogacy arrangements, subjecting offenders to civil 
fines, imprisonment, or both.10 Therefore, the outcome of each 
gestational surrogacy agreement is entirely dependent on which 
state law controls the situation and how that particular state has 
chosen to handle gestational surrogacy contracts.  
California and Connecticut are two states that have chosen 
to permit gestational surrogacy arrangements by statutorily 
regulating the gestational surrogacy process. However, despite 
the fact that California and Connecticut have taken similar 
approaches to regulating gestational surrogacy, the statutory 
schemes utilized by these states differ greatly from one another. 
As will be discussed below, California’s statutes provide more 
specific and thorough regulations of the gestational carrier 
process, while Connecticut’s statutes provide the bare minimum 
in terms of detail.  
This Comment will argue that states should implement 
comprehensive statutory regulations for gestational surrogacy 
agreements that provide specific and complete guidelines for 
parties wishing to create these contracts. Part I will provide 
relevant background information and a brief history of assisted 
reproductive technology in the United States. Part II will outline 
and analyze the relevant California and Connecticut gestational 
surrogacy statutes, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of 
the current regulations in place in those states. Part III will 
propose that states wishing to enact legislation to regulate and 
enforce gestational agreements should emulate the approach 
utilized by the California legislature, as opposed to that of the 
Connecticut legislature, since California’s statutory scheme is 
more complete, stringent, and efficient. Finally, Part IV will 
 
 8 John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 911, 924 (1996); see also infra Part I.C. 
 9 See Diane S. Hinson, State-by-State Surrogacy Law: Actual Practices, CREATIVE 
FAM. CONNECTIONS (2013), http://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/state-map-surro 
gacy-law-practices. 
 10 D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2014) (“Any person . . . who . . . violates this section, shall be 
subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, 
or both.”).  
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briefly discuss the need for state legislatures to strike a delicate 
balance when creating surrogacy-based statutory regulations.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY  
A.  Assisted Reproductive Technology  
For people who are unable to conceive or carry a child 
naturally, there are many alternative approaches that can be 
utilized to help start a family. Many couples choose adoption, 
which is both a costly and time-consuming process.11 In recent 
years, however, an increasing number of people have turned to 
assisted reproductive technology, commonly referred to as “ART,” 
as a means to have children. ART has been defined in varying 
ways, but the broadest definition includes “any technology that is 
employed to conceive a child by means other than sexual 
intercourse.”12 Such technology includes egg donation, embryo 
donation, in vitro fertilization, and the transfer of fertilized 
embryos.13  
The first uses of ART began in the mid-1970s, and the 
world’s first “test-tube baby” was born as a result of these early 
ART procedures in 1978.14 The number of ART cycles performed 
in the United States per year has drastically increased, and in 
2011 a total of 151,923 ART cycles took place.15  
The possibilities ART provides to individuals who need 
assistance starting a family are great. Unlike adoption, couples 
 
 11 Adoptions performed independently or through private adoption agencies can cost 
upwards of $40,000. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF ADOPTING 2 (2011), available at https://www.child 
welfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costs.pdf. Inter-country adoptions often take well over a year to 
complete, and some countries even require adoptive parents to live in the foreign country 
for six months before completing the adoption. James G. Dwyer, Inter-country Adoption 
and the Special Rights Fallacy, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 189, 191 (2013).  
 12 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE, at xii (2006)); see also 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (defining “assisted reproductive technology” as 
“all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled”).  
 13 Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597 (2002).  
 14 Louise Brown was the first child born as a result of in vitro fertilization (IVF). 
Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. 
L. REV. 609, 619 (1997).  
 15 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 2011, at 47 
(2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2011/PDFs/ART_2011_National_Summ 
ary_Report.pdf. This number more than doubled from a total of 64,681 ART cycles that 
took place in 1996. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL 
SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 61 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ 
ART 2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf.  
Do Not Delete 2/15/2015 7:40 PM 
556 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:2 
utilizing ART have the ability to be genetically related to the 
resulting child.16 Women who are unable to carry a child to term, 
but are otherwise reproductively healthy, can still be genetically 
related to their child through these technologies.17 Reproductive 
technology has even come so far as to allow a child to be 
genetically related to two mothers, as well as a father.18 
B.  Surrogacy: A Form of ART  
One form of ART is surrogacy, which includes two specific 
subcategories: traditional surrogates and gestational carriers. A 
traditional surrogate is a woman who becomes pregnant by way 
of a sperm donor and carries the pregnancy to term.19 In a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement, the woman carrying the child 
is the biological mother and agrees to relinquish all parental 
rights to her child upon giving birth.20 Statistics on the rates of 
traditional surrogacy in the United States are rare, and some 
studies have gone so far as to say there is “no data whatsoever on 
the use of traditional surrogacy.”21 Lack of statistical data aside, 
traditional surrogacy has been present in society for hundreds, if 
not thousands, of years.22  
A gestational carrier, however, is a woman who is not related 
to the child she carries and ultimately bears. In a gestational 
carrier arrangement, the woman “is implanted with the sperm of 
the biological father and the eggs of the biological 
mother[,] . . . eliminating any biological relationship between the 
surrogate mother and child.”23 Gestational carrier arrangements 
 
 16 Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate 
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 21, 22 (1989) (arguing for contractual 
enforcement of traditional surrogacy contracts, which allow for “genetic continuity” 
between at least one intended parent and the child).  
 17 Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The “Orwellian Nightmare” Reconsidered: A Proposed 
Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 
640–41 (1991).  
 18 In a technique known as “egg cell nuclear transfer,” the nucleus of one woman’s 
egg cell can be joined with an enucleated egg cell from another woman, which creates an 
egg cell comprised of two different sets of DNA. Bonnie Steinbock, Defining Parenthood, 
in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 107, 107 (JR Spencer & Antje 
du Bois-Pedain eds., 2006).  
 19 SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING 
LAW AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 209 (2010). 
 20 MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN 
AMERICA 1, 6 (2010), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/page 
documents/kaevej0a1m.pdf. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Christine L. Kerian, Note, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile 
Women or a Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
113, 116–17 (1997) (positing that surrogacy dates back to the Old Testament).  
 23 Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 97, 98–99 (2010). 
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in the United States have grown rapidly in recent years, nearly 
doubling in frequency from 2004 to 2008.24 
C.  Surrogacy Statutes Throughout the United States  
With the increased frequency of ART and surrogacy 
arrangements in the United States, legislation to regulate these 
procedures became a necessary and logical step for states. Yet, 
how states have chosen to go about regulating surrogacy and 
gestational carrier agreements is entirely inconsistent. Some 
states have decided to ban surrogacy and prohibit the 
enforcement of traditional or gestational surrogacy agreements 
entirely.25 A few states have held that surrogacy contracts are 
only legal if the woman carrying the child is not compensated.26 
Other states have explicitly enacted legislation holding these 
arrangements to be valid,27 while some states merely rely on case 
law to uphold surrogacy agreements.28 Yet, some states have 
simply left the issue alone for now, and remain without case law 
or statutes addressing the validity of surrogacy.29 Given this lack 
of consensus amongst states regarding surrogacy, a great 
responsibility is placed upon all parties entering into such 
 
 24 The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) found the number of 
children born via gestational surrogacy per year to rise from 738 in 2004 to 1395 in 2008. 
GUGUCHEVA, supra note 20, at 11–12. In the last several years, many celebrities have 
even turned to gestational carriers as a way to have children. Celebrities Who Used 
Surrogate Mothers, FOX NEWS MAG. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://magazine.foxnews.com/at-
home/celeb rities-who-used-surrogate-mothers. 
 25 Robertson, supra note 8, at 924. Indiana’s statute declares enforcement of a 
surrogacy contract to be against public policy. IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2014). Michigan’s 
statutes also prohibit surrogacy contracts on the basis of public policy. MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 722.855 (2014).  
 26 Spivack, supra note 23, at 101 (including Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New 
York, North Carolina, and Washington). Furthermore, Louisiana’s surrogacy laws are 
presently in a state of flux, with the governor vetoing a recently proposed bill. Louisiana 
House Bill 187, LEGISCAN, http://legiscan.com/LA/bill/HB187/2014 (last visited Jan. 10, 
2015). This bill sought to permit gestational surrogacy only in the case of a married man 
and woman using their own genetic material. H.R. 187, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014). 
Aside from limiting the use of egg and sperm donors in these arrangements, this bill 
restricted homosexual couples from engaging in gestational carrier contracts in Louisiana 
whatsoever. Id. Critics of the bill considered this proposed legislation a reminder that 
true reproductive freedom is not yet a reality. See Richard Vaughn, Louisiana Surrogacy 
Bill Advances from Bad to Worse, INT’L FERTILITY L. GROUP (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.iflg.net/louisiana-surrogacy-bill-advances-from-bad-to-worse/. 
 27 These states include California and Illinois. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2014); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25 (2014).  
 28 For Ohio’s Supreme Court decision finding gestational surrogacy contracts do not 
violate public policy see J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007). Maryland case law 
supports the enforcement of gestational surrogacy contracts as well. See In re Roberto 
d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (finding a gestational carrier was allowed to not be listed as 
the child’s birth mother and, instead, the child’s father could be listed as the only parent).   
 29 Hinson, supra note 9 (citing Alaska, Georgia, Delaware, and several other states 
as having no definitive case law or statute on the issue of gestational surrogacy).  
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agreements to be well informed of the legal landscape of their 
particular state.30 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF GESTATIONAL CARRIER 
REGULATIONS: CALIFORNIA AND CONNECTICUT AS EXAMPLES  
As if the inherent disparity between how states choose to 
address gestational carrier agreements isn’t enough, there is a 
great lack of uniformity among states that have enacted 
legislation protecting surrogacy and regulating the process. 
While these states have all determined that surrogacy and 
gestational carrier agreements are permissible, a shockingly 
small number have enacted comprehensive regulatory schemes to 
control the surrogacy process. Without thorough and detailed 
guidelines for gestational carrier agreements, the courts, legal 
professionals, and citizens looking to enter into these agreements 
are left in need of answers.  
California and Connecticut are states that have both 
determined gestational carrier contracts to be permissible31 and 
have enacted legislation specifically addressing such contracts. 
However, the differences between California’s and Connecticut’s 
regulation of gestational carrier agreements are vast. This 
section will discuss those differences in depth and identify the 
ways Connecticut’s statutory scheme is lacking in substance.  
A.  California Case Law  
1. Establishing the Intent Doctrine for Determining 
Parentage 
The current framework of California’s gestational surrogacy 
statutes had its beginning in case law. The most influential case, 
Johnson v. Calvert, established the intent doctrine for 
determining legal parentage.32 In Johnson, Mark and Crispina 
Calvert were a married couple who could not have a child 
traditionally.33 They contracted with Anna Johnson to gestate an 
embryo comprised of Mark’s sperm and Crispina’s egg.34 
However, the relationship between the Calverts and Johnson 
deteriorated and the Calverts initiated suit to declare that they 
were the legal parents of the child. Johnson responded with an 
 
 30 CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 19, at 212–13.  
 31 While both California and Connecticut allow parties to enter into gestational 
carrier agreements, Connecticut’s statutes do not contain a presumption of validity 
provision for these contracts. See infra Part II.C.5.  
 32 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).  
 33 Id. at 778.  
 34 Id.  
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action to assert her status as the child’s legal mother.35 In 
holding that Johnson had no legal rights to the child, the court 
reasoned that the Calverts were the legal parents of the child 
based on their intention in entering into the gestational carrier 
contract.36 The court articulated the intent doctrine, which it 
identified as the proper way to determine the child’s parentage, 
as “when [genetic consanguinity and giving birth] . . . do not 
coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—
that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that 
she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under 
California law.”37 
2. Expanding the Intent Doctrine 
After Johnson v. Calvert, case law in California quickly 
expanded the application of the intent doctrine to extend beyond 
married heterosexual couples who were genetically related to the 
child. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca, the California Court of 
Appeal extended the intent doctrine to include parents who were 
not genetically related to a child born via a gestational surrogacy 
arrangement.38 Luanne and John Buzzanca entered into a 
contract with a gestational carrier, under which the woman 
would carry and give birth to a child genetically unrelated to 
either John or Luanne.39 After divorcing, Luanne claimed that 
she and John were the lawful parents, while John claimed he had 
no legal obligation to the child.40 Astonishingly, the trial court 
found that the child had no legal parents.41 The Court of Appeal 
disagreed with the trial court’s decision and found that John and 
Luanne were the child’s legal parents “given their initiating role 
as the intended parents in [the child’s] conception and birth.”42  
The court in Buzzanca expressed concern that the state of 
gestational surrogacy laws was woefully underdeveloped and 
specifically made a call for the legislature to address the problem. 
The court noted that artificial reproduction, including artificial 
insemination, traditional surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, and 
 
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. at 782.  
 37 Id. 
 38 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  
 39 Id.  
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. The trial court reasoned that the gestational carrier and her husband were not 
the lawful parents because neither was genetically related to the child. The trial court 
then found that Luanne was not the mother because she had neither provided the egg nor 
given birth to the child. Finally, the court found that John was not the legal father 
because he had not contributed his sperm to the embryo implanted in the gestational 
carrier. Id. The Court of Appeal also noted that the woman and man who donated the egg 
and sperm to create the embryo made no legal claim to the child. Id. at 288.  
 42 Id. at 293.  
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even cloning, is something that the courts will have to address. 
The court asked the legislature to enact a law that, even if not 
perfectly implemented on a case-by-case basis, “would bring some 
predictability to those who seek to make use of artificial 
reproductive techniques.”43  
In 2000, the California Court of Appeal further expanded the 
reach of the intent doctrine for determining parentage to include 
parents who were not married when they contracted to bring 
about the birth of the child. In Dunkin v. Boskey, an unmarried 
couple entered into an agreement to use artificial insemination 
by an anonymous sperm donor to conceive their child.44 After the 
child was born, the parents ended their relationship and sought 
to establish a custody agreement.45 The court held that the intent 
doctrine also applies to unmarried couples and the man who 
contracted to create the child was the legal father.46 The court 
noted that the decision to apply the intent test in this way 
“serves . . . the compelling public policies of family law to 
legitim[ize] children, provide for their support, foster the best 
interests of the child, and promote familial responsibility.”47  
In 2005, the Supreme Court of California expanded the 
intent doctrine again to apply to situations where same-sex 
couples had intended to create a child through ART. In Elisa B. 
v. Superior Court, an unmarried lesbian couple utilized artificial 
insemination to conceive children with the aid of a sperm donor.48 
After ending their relationship, the women sought to establish 
the legal parentage of their three children.49 The court held that 
both women were the legal parents of all three children under 
the intent doctrine.50 In Elisa B., the court referenced the 
legislature’s declaration that “‘[t]here is a compelling state 
interest in establishing paternity for all children,’” as doing so 
provides children with “both emotional and financial support.”51  
 
 43 Id.  
 44 Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). There are two 
kinds of artificial insemination: homologous and heterologous. Homologous insemination 
involves the use of the husband’s sperm to create the child and, as a result, does not raise 
any questions about the child’s paternity. Heterologous insemination utilizes the semen of 
a third-party donor to conceive a child. People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 498 n.2 (Cal. 
1968). 
 45 Dunkin, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48.  
 46 Id. at 56.  
 47 Id. 
 48 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 663 (Cal. 2005).  
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 670.  
 51 Id. at 669.  
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B.  Connecticut Case Law  
1. Early Case Law  
Connecticut case law, as compared to California’s, has been 
slower to adopt the intent doctrine for determining legal 
parentage in gestational carrier agreements. In 2007, a 
Connecticut superior court found that a husband and wife were 
the legal parents of a child conceived under a gestational carrier 
agreement.52 In that case, and many others with similar factual 
situations, the court examined the gestational carrier agreement 
and determined that the agreement was reasonable, fair, and 
valid.53 However, the courts in Connecticut were not consistent 
with their decisions concerning gestational carrier agreements. 
In 2008, a Connecticut superior court explicitly refused to apply 
the intent doctrine and held that the biological father’s same-sex 
partner needed to legally adopt the child in order to be included 
on the birth certificate as a parent.54 Instead of utilizing the 
intent doctrine, the court focused on the best interests of the 
child and reasoned that a formal adoption process was better 
suited to serve the child’s overall interests.55 In support for the 
best interest test, the court cited legal scholars who advocated 
that a child’s interests were better served by adoption than by 
the more removed and less thorough intent doctrine.56 The court 
raised concerns about the state of Connecticut’s gestational 
surrogacy laws and called upon the legislature to establish a 
regulatory scheme to govern such transactions.57 
 
 52 De Bernardo v. Gregory, No. FA074007658S, 2007 WL 4357736, at *4 (Conn. Nov. 
7, 2007). 
 53 See Griffiths v. Taylor, No. FA084015629, 2008 WL 2745130, at *7 (Conn. June 
13, 2008) (finding that two homosexual domestic partners were the legal parents of a child 
born via a valid gestational surrogacy agreement); Davis v. Kania, 836 A.2d 480, 483 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding a gestational carrier agreement valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable under the laws of Connecticut).  
 54 Oleski v. Hynes, No. KNLFA084008415, 2008 WL 2930518, at *12 (Conn. July 10, 
2008).  
 55 Id. at *10.  
 56 Id. (quoting Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the 
Maze of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REV. 127 (2000)).  
 57 Id. at *11. The court posed the following concern about continuing to leave 
regulation of gestational carrier agreements in the hands of the judiciary:  
The combination of high vulnerability on the part of their consumers, the 
presumably lucrative environment in which these services are being provided, 
the lack of public awareness as to what they do and how they do it, and the 
fundamental, lifelong consequences to the children whose lives their efforts 
literally bring into being all warrant discussion of whether our becoming one of 
the few, if not the only venue in this land in which such a business can be 
carried on without effective supervision, is a desirable goal.  
Id.  
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2. Establishing the Intent Doctrine for Determining 
Parentage 
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Connecticut followed 
California’s lead and adopted the intent doctrine for deciding a 
child’s legal parentage under gestational surrogacy agreements.58 
In Raftopol v. Ramey, two male domestic partners contracted 
with a woman to carry children who were to be genetically 
related to one of the two men.59 The court found both men were 
properly named as the legal parents of the children and reasoned 
“that the legislature intended . . . to confer parental status on an 
intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement 
irrespective of that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the 
children.”60 The court noted its decision to adopt the intent test 
was influenced directly by Johnson v. Calvert.61 Finally, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court in Raftopol expressed concerns about 
the “many remaining ambiguities” in Connecticut’s gestational 
carrier statutes and impliedly called upon the legislature to 
remedy these ambiguities.62  
C.  Current Statutes in California and Connecticut  
In response in part to the judicial pleas in Buzzanca and 
Raftopol, both California and Connecticut enacted and currently 
follow statutory schemes that attempt to regulate the surrogacy 
process. At first glance, it appears that California and 
Connecticut have both adopted sufficient legislation and, 
therefore, taken the steps necessary to appropriately regulate 
traditional and gestational surrogacy. However, further analysis 
reveals that California’s statutory scheme is much more 
comprehensive and effective than Connecticut’s legislation, 
which leaves much to be desired.  
1. Definitions Provided  
a. Definitions in California and Connecticut Statutes  
Under current California law, the legislature has provided 
definitions for many terms relating to ART and, specifically, 
gestational carrier agreements. These definitions have fully 
incorporated the intent doctrine, first established in Johnson 
 
 58 See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011).  
 59 Id. at 787.  
 60 Id. at 799.  
 61 Id. at 801.  
 62 Id. at 797. The court identified some of the ambiguities present in Connecticut 
law, which included the nature and scope of the phrase “order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction,” the types of gestational agreements that were covered under the law, and 
who could be recognized as an intended parent. Id. 
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v. Calvert,63 into California law. The term “assisted reproduction 
agreement” is defined as “a written contract that includes a 
person who intends to be the legal parent of a child or children 
born through assisted reproduction and that defines the terms of 
the relationship between the parties to the contract.”64 California 
law also defines the term “intended parent” to mean an 
“individual, married or unmarried, who manifests the intent to 
be legally bound as the parent of a child resulting from assisted 
reproduction.”65 The statute also provides a definition of the term 
“assisted reproduction.”66  
As previously discussed, there are two types of surrogacy and 
each gives rise to unique concerns regarding implementation and 
public policy. The California legislature took care to define these 
terms separately and make clear that each type of surrogacy 
presents a very different factual situation.67 Other terms that are 
statutorily defined include “non-attorney surrogacy facilitator,” 
“surrogacy facilitator,” and “fund management agreement.”68  
Turning to Connecticut’s relevant surrogacy statutes, 
Connecticut law defines “gestational agreement” as “a written 
agreement for assisted reproduction in which a woman agrees to 
carry a child to birth for an intended parent or intended parents, 
which woman contributed no genetic material to the child.”69 The 
statute also defines “intended parent” to mean “a party to a 
gestational agreement who agrees, under the gestational 
agreement, to be the parent of a child born to a woman by means 
of assisted reproduction, regardless of whether the party has a 
genetic relationship to the child.”70 This definition makes no 
mention of whether the party to the gestational agreement may 
be married or unmarried, as the California definition provides.71 
Importantly, Connecticut law does not provide a definition for 
 
 63 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). 
 64 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7606(b) (West 2014) (emphasis added).  
 65 Id. § 7960(c).  
 66 “Assisted reproduction” is defined by the California Family Code as “conception by 
any means other than sexual intercourse.” Id. § 7606(a).  
 67 The term “surrogate” is defined as “a woman who bears and carries a child for 
another through medically assisted reproduction and pursuant to a written agreement.” 
Id. § 7960(f). “Surrogate” is then further defined to include traditional and gestational 
surrogates. “Traditional surrogate” is defined as “a woman who agrees to gestate an 
embryo, in which the woman is the gamete donor and the embryo was created using the 
sperm of the intended father or a donor arranged by the intended parent or parents.” 
Id. § 7960(f)(1). “Gestational carrier,” or “surrogate,” is defined as “a woman who is not an 
intended parent and who agrees to gestate an embryo that is genetically unrelated to her 
pursuant to an assisted reproduction agreement.” Id. § 7960(f)(2). 
 68 See id. § 7960(b), (d), (e). 
 69 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-36(16) (2014). 
 70 Id. § 7-36(17). 
 71 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7960(c). 
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surrogacy, nor does it distinguish between traditional surrogacy 
and gestational carrier agreements.  
b. Analysis of Definitions Provided  
California law provides more complete definitions regarding 
statutory terms and language. Connecticut law makes no 
mention of the marital status of intended parents, while 
California specifically provides that intended parents can be 
either married or unmarried. This may present significant 
problems for the Connecticut judiciary in interpreting the 
current statute and determining whether it even applies to 
unmarried intended parents.72 Absent statutory language 
indicating otherwise, the question of whether the intent doctrine 
applies to unmarried couples will necessarily be left up to the 
courts.  
Furthermore, Connecticut law does not explicitly make clear 
the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogates. 
Although Connecticut law does indicate that gestational 
agreements apply only to women who have contributed no 
genetic material to the child,73 greater clarity could be achieved 
by explaining the difference between traditional and gestational 
surrogacy arrangements. In enacting the current statutory 
scheme in California, the legislature made clear that separating 
out the definitions of traditional and gestational surrogates 
would help to specifically limit the other provisions of the statute 
to gestational carrier agreements, rather than traditional 
surrogates.74 This increased level of clarity helps provide 
contracting parties with a better understanding of what type of 
agreements are permitted under the law.  
2. Requirements for the Contents of Gestational Agreements  
Gestational carrier and surrogacy agreements are a type of 
contract governed by contract law.75 There are issues that arise 
when considering the implications of utilizing contract law to 
govern these agreements; however, efficient statutory schemes, 
like California’s, specifically address certain terms and 
 
 72 California case law first answered this question in Dunkin v. Boskey, holding that 
the intent doctrine for determining parentage applies to unmarried couples, as well as 
married couples. See Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
Connecticut case law, however, has never specifically addressed the issue of whether the 
intent doctrine applies to unmarried couples.  
 73 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-36(17). 
 74 Assemb. 1217, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 75 See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 
VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995) (arguing that surrogacy contracts can be fully regulated under the 
canons of contract law).  
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conditions that must be included in these contracts.76 This 
specificity provides contracting parties with more certainty and 
predictability before the child is even conceived.77 The more 
detailed contractual requirements mandated by California’s 
statutes provide more guidance for intended parents, gestational 
carriers, legal professionals, and the courts.  
a. Requirements Under California and Connecticut Law 
California law includes many requirements for gestational 
carrier agreements to be presumed valid. Written gestational 
carrier agreements must include the following: (1) the date on 
which the agreement was executed; (2) information identifying 
the persons from which the gametes originated, unless donated 
anonymously; and (3) the identity of the intended parent or 
parents.78 Before parties complete the written gestational carrier 
agreement, each party must secure independent legal counsel to 
represent them in the execution of the agreement.79 This means 
both the intended parents and gestational carrier must find and 
retain licensed attorneys of their choosing before any written 
agreement can be created. The agreement must also be signed by 
all parties and notarized.80  
Connecticut law requires three main components for 
gestational surrogacy agreements. The agreement must: (1) 
name each party to the agreement and indicate each party’s 
respective obligations under the agreement; (2) be signed by each 
party to the agreement and the spouse of each party, if any; and 
(3) be witnessed by at least two disinterested adults and 
acknowledged in the manner prescribed by law.81 Under 
Connecticut law, the parties are not required to identify the 
sperm and egg donors, or even indicate where the gametes were 
obtained. Furthermore, Connecticut law does not require that the 
parties be represented by separate legal counsel. In fact, under 
Connecticut law, the parties to a gestational carrier agreement 
need not be represented by legal counsel at all.  
 
 76 Id. at 2335.  
 77 Lori B. Andrews, Commentary, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework 
for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2368 (1995) (arguing that enforcing 
surrogacy contracts will not allow surrogates to change their mind and initiate long, 
taxing court battles to determine the legal parents of the child; instead, all parties 
involved will know who is to be the legal parents from the time the contract is entered 
into, creating certainty).  
 78 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(1)–(3) (West 2014). 
 79 Id. § 7962(b). 
 80 Id. § 7962(c). 
 81 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-36(16) (2014). 
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b. Analysis of Statutory Requirements  
California’s legislation provides clearer guidelines as to what 
gestational carrier contracts must contain. California law 
requires the parties to identify where the gametes came from, 
unless donated anonymously,82 and to be represented by 
independent legal counsel before entering into the agreement83—
provisions the Connecticut statutes make no mention of. 
Requiring that parties to the agreement obtain separate legal 
counsel ensures that the interests of all parties will be advocated 
for and protected by a licensed attorney. Absent a similar 
provision, Connecticut’s statutes would allow for one attorney to 
represent both parties in the agreement or, worse, for neither 
party to be represented by an attorney in drafting the contract. 
Although attorneys are bound by the applicable rules of 
professional conduct,84 having one attorney represent both 
parties does not ensure that each side will receive proper and 
effective representation. Legislative history reveals that the 
California legislature was specifically concerned with the 
possibility of ineffectual representation, and it was this fear that 
led to the inclusion of the independent counsel provision.85 
Independent counsel for both parties was considered necessary 
“because of the complexities of surrogacy agreements,” and 
independent counsel was seen as a way to ensure both the 
contract’s validity and that all parties were clear on their rights 
and responsibilities under the agreement.86  
3. Regulation of the Gestational Carrier Process 
The actual process of conceiving a child through ART and 
utilizing a surrogate or gestational carrier’s services is incredibly 
complex. Obtaining the donor gametes and implanting the 
embryos involves many medical procedures and various types of 
medications.87 Intended parents often utilize the services of 
companies that specialize in facilitating and creating gestational 
carrier agreements, which introduces a third party into the 
situation.88 Finally, gestational carrier contracts often concern a 
 
 82 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(2). 
 83 Id. § 7962(b). 
 84 The Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from 
representing a client where the client’s interests are adverse to that of an existing client . 
CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2014).  
 85 Assemb. 1217, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See ART: Step-by-Step Guide, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., www.sart.org/ 
detail.aspx?id=1903 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).  
 88 Patient Resources, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www. 
cdc.gov/art/PatientResources.htm (last updated July 2, 2013) (explaining that “[i]n the 
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great deal of money used for medical procedures, medications, 
and monetary compensation for the woman carrying the 
pregnancy.89 Monitoring the medical and financial aspects of the 
gestational carrier process requires that states include specific 
statutory language to address these issues.  
a. Regulation of Process in California and Connecticut  
Aside from regulating the contents of the gestational carrier 
agreement itself, the process of actually conceiving a child and 
managing the finances are also controlled by the applicable 
California statutes. First and foremost, before any medical steps 
can be made towards conceiving a child, California law mandates 
that the gestational carrier agreement be properly executed and 
completed.90 Unless the agreement meets all of the requirements 
listed in the previous section, parties are not permitted to even 
begin medically preparing for an anticipated embryo transfer.  
The gestational surrogacy process is further regulated by 
statute through requirements concerning the handling of money 
related to the agreement. The statute provides clear instructions 
for surrogacy facilitators and attorneys regarding how to handle 
client funds. All client funds must be placed in either “[a]n 
independent, bonded escrow depository maintained by a licensed, 
independent, bonded escrow company” or “[a] trust account 
maintained by an attorney.”91 Furthermore, the statute explains 
that “[c]lient funds may only be disbursed by the attorney or 
escrow agent as set forth in the assisted reproduction agreement 
and fund management agreement.”92 The statute also provides 
guidelines for funds that do not need to meet these stringent 
requirements.93  
Connecticut law does not specifically contain any provisions 
that regulate the process of gestational carrier agreements. The 
statutes make no mention of the general timeline of the process 
 
United States, more than 440 clinics provide services to patients seeking to overcome 
infertility” through the use of ART).  
 89 See generally Financial Information, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., 
http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1891 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).  
 90 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(d) (West 2014) (“The parties to an assisted 
reproduction agreement for gestational carriers shall not undergo an embryo transfer 
procedure, or commence injectable medication in preparation for an embryo transfer for 
assisted reproduction purposes, until the assisted reproduction agreement for gestational 
carriers has been fully executed as required by subdivisions (b) and (c) of this section.”).  
 91 Id. § 7961(a). 
 92 Id. § 7961(c). 
 93 See id. § 7961(d) (“This section shall not apply to funds that are both of the 
following: (1) Not provided for in the fund management agreement. (2) Paid directly to a 
medical doctor for medical services or a psychologist for psychological services.”).  
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or of how monetary funds are to be managed and maintained 
throughout the process.  
b. Analysis of Statutory Regulation of Process  
California law requires that the parties hold off on all 
medical procedures, including the injection of medication in 
preparation for procedures, until a valid agreement is in place.94 
Connecticut law is void of any similar requirement and does not 
regulate the actual gestational carrier process in any way. This 
type of provision provides procedural safeguards for both the 
intended parents and the gestational carrier and demands that 
each side is fully aware of their obligations under the contract 
before beginning the process of actually conceiving a child. This 
kind of regulation provides the contracting parties with a clear 
timeline of how the entire gestational carrier process must be 
executed, which provides predictability to all involved parties.  
As previously stated, gestational carrier arrangements can 
be incredibly expensive and often require that a great deal of 
money change hands. Connecticut statutes are completely void of 
any regulation for the monetary aspects of these agreements. 
These kinds of regulations are absolutely essential in 
safeguarding parties against fraud. A recent example of such 
fraud comes from California where Tonya Collins, founder and 
operator of surrogacy agency SurroGenesis, defrauded dozens of 
families looking to have a child through gestational carriers.95 
Collins created a fake financial firm to handle the financial 
aspects of the gestational carrier business and used upwards of 
$2 million of client funds for cars, jewelry, vacations, and other 
personal expenses.96 State laws regulating the handling of money 
in gestational carrier arrangements provide an important 
financial safeguard for intended parents who invest a significant 
amount of money in these arrangements. 
4. Establishing the Parent-Child Relationship  
Determining the legal parentage of a child born pursuant to 
a gestational carrier agreement is of the utmost importance to 
ensure that someone is legally responsible for the well-being of 
the child. Some states require that the intended parents legally 
 
 94 See id. § 7962(d). 
 95 See Carlos Saucedo, Surrogacy Scam Unites Valley Families, ABC30 (May 15, 
2013, 12:03 AM), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?id=9100963.  
 96 Id.; see also Maria Medina, SurroGenesis Scams Women Wanting Children, CBS 
SACRAMENTO (Apr. 20, 2012, 11:50 PM), http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2012/04/20/surro 
genesis-scams-women-wanting-children/. 
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adopt the child after he or she is born.97 However, California and 
Connecticut have opted to utilize pre-birth judgments to 
establish legal parentage, and both states have provided for this 
option in their respective statutes.98 This statutory approach 
provides more certainty to the intended parents and stability to 
the child, which ultimately supports the child’s best interests.99  
California law provides for pre-birth judgments so that the 
intended parents can be listed on the child’s birth certificate as 
the legal parents.100 An action to achieve this “may be filed before 
the child’s birth” and “[t]he judgment or order may be issued 
before or after the child’s or children’s birth.”101 Furthermore, an 
action to establish the parent-child relationship may be brought 
by any party to the gestational carrier agreement, so long as the 
order sought is consistent with that agreement.102 
Connecticut’s approach to establishing a parent-child 
relationship is essentially identical to California’s statutory 
language. Just as in California, pre-birth judgments are 
permitted in Connecticut and, as a result, the intended parents 
can be listed on the child’s birth certificate from the moment the 
child is born.103 Furthermore, Connecticut law provides that the 
replacement birth certificate issued, which will list the intended 
parents as the child’s parents, “shall include all information 
required to be included in a certificate of birth” and be exactly 
the same as a birth certificate issued for a child who is not the 
product of a gestational agreement.104  
 
 97 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009) 
(holding that the genetic mother to the child in question could only legally establish 
parentage through adoption when the child was born to the genetic mother’s wife through 
means of implanting the embryo into the wife’s uterus).  
 98 Pre-birth judgments present several benefits to the parties in a gestational carrier 
agreement, including the ability of the intended parents to make all medical decisions for 
the child from the moment of its birth, the ability of the hospital to discharge the child to 
the intended parents, the solidification of insurance coverage for the child under the 
intended parent’s plan, and emotional stability for both the intended parents and the 
child from the moment of birth. Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of 
Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 634–35 (2005).  
 99 See Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive 
Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196 (1986).  
 100 A recently approved California bill requires that birth certificates in California 
replace the existing fields currently labeled as “Name of Mother” and “Name of Father” 
with “Name of Parent.” Each parent is then able to further identify as the child’s 
“mother,” “father,” or “parent” by checking the applicable box. Assemb. 1951, 2014 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
 101 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(e), (f)(2) (West 2014). 
 102 Id. § 7630(f). 
 103 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-48a(b) (2014). 
 104 Id. 
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5. Presumption of Validity 
Finally, if gestational carrier contracts are deemed to be 
presumptively valid, courts will not have to determine whether 
the contract is valid. Such a presumption will provide greater 
certainty to both the intended parents and the woman acting as 
the gestational carrier in these agreements. 
a. Presumption of Validity in California and Connecticut 
Statutes  
California law contains specific provisions that provide a 
presumption of validity for gestational surrogacy contracts. 
Addressing the concern that surrogate mothers giving birth to 
the child may attempt to assert their rights as parents, 
California law states: 
A notarized assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers 
signed by all the parties, with the attached declarations of 
independent attorneys, and lodged with the superior court . . . shall 
rebut any presumptions . . . as to the gestational carrier surrogate, 
her spouse, or partner being a parent of the child or children.105 
Furthermore, California law extends a presumption of validity to 
all gestational carrier agreements executed in accordance with 
California Family Code section 7962, meaning the agreement 
cannot be revoked or rescinded without a court order.106 
Unlike California law, Connecticut statutes do not contain a 
presumption of validity provision for gestational carrier 
agreements. Parties who enter into these agreements in 
Connecticut are not provided statutory protection as to the 
validity of their agreements, regardless of whether the 
agreement complies with the other provisions of Connecticut law.  
b. Analysis of Statutory Approaches to Presumption of 
Validity  
Connecticut’s lack of presumed validity for gestational 
carrier agreements provides less protection to parties engaged in 
these contracts. When the law presumes the validity of these 
agreements, all parties involved have much more certainty when 
entering into the contract. If a state presumes these agreements 
to be valid, surrogate mothers will be less likely to believe they 
have a right to custody of the child, and intended parents will 
 
 105 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(1). 
 106 Id. § 7962(i). 
Do Not Delete 2/15/2015 7:40 PM 
2015] The Regulation of Gestation 571 
have more certainty that when their baby is born, they, and they 
alone, will have a legal claim to custody.107  
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: STATES ENACTING GESTATIONAL 
CARRIER STATUTES SHOULD EMULATE CALIFORNIA’S STATUTORY 
SCHEME TO BETTER REGULATE THESE ARRANGEMENTS  
In creating the statutes currently in place, the California 
legislature expressed its desire to provide intended parents, 
surrogates, and courts with “a clear procedure to follow in 
creating and enforcing surrogacy agreements and determining 
parental rights.”108 While Connecticut law does provide some 
guidance to parties wishing to enter into these agreements, 
Connecticut’s statutory scheme is just one example of how some 
states may be able to do a better job of comprehensively 
regulating gestational carrier agreements. Ultimately, states 
looking to enact statutes for the first time, or to amend their 
current laws, should more closely follow California’s statutory 
approach in order to provide clearer and more complete 
guidelines for gestational carrier agreements.  
All states should write or amend their gestational surrogacy 
statutes to include more complete definitions of relevant terms. It 
is necessary for the legislature to provide definitions for statutory 
terms so that questions do not arise as to a word’s meaning. The 
Supreme Court has noted the importance of providing definitions 
for terms given that “statutory definitions control the meaning of 
statutory words.”109 If a statute provides a definition for a term, 
courts “must follow that definition, even if it varies from that 
term’s ordinary meaning.”110 Furthermore, “‘[a] definition which 
declares what a term “means” . . . excludes any meaning that is 
not stated.’”111 If the legislature fails to provide a definition for a 
term, it falls on the judiciary to interpret the meaning of those 
terms. In doing so, courts may turn to dictionaries, uses of the 
same term in other statutes, the legislative purpose in enacting 
the statute, and other forms of legislative history.112 However, if 
the legislature does provide a definition and meaning of terms, 
courts must simply look to the statutory definition alone, and the 
 
 107 June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of 
Surrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 610 (1988).  
 108 CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., BILL ANALYSIS FOR CA A.B. 1217: SURROGACY 
AGREEMENTS 10 (2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_12 
01-1250/ab_1217_cfa_20120702_135152_sen_comm.html.  
 109 Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949).  
 110 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).  
 111 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979) (internal citations omitted).  
 112 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085, 2104 (2002).  
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judiciary does not need to resort to guessing at the legislature’s 
meaning.113 
As previously mentioned, traditional and gestational 
surrogacy are different procedures that lead to different legal 
outcomes and varying policy implications.114 States should 
explicitly make clear this important distinction to provide courts 
and contracting parties with a greater understanding of what 
kinds of agreements will be permitted. Definitions provided in 
statutes can often be the deciding factor in a court’s 
interpretation of a case, and statutory definitions have even 
given rise to political debates.115  
States should also include specific statutory requirements for 
the legal representation of parties when creating written 
gestational carrier agreements. California’s provision for each 
party to be represented by independent legal counsel in creating 
the agreement ensures that both parties will be on an equal 
playing field. Many critics of surrogacy argue that women who 
agree to carry another family’s child are driven solely by 
monetary concerns and are forced by their economic situation to 
sell their reproductive abilities.116 Such situations lead to 
concerns of duress or coercion in contracting.117 Legal 
representation will help parties be fully informed of their 
obligations under the agreement and to understand the legal 
implications of the surrogacy contract. Requiring parties to be 
represented by legal counsel ensures that the parties will discuss 
all essential terms and obligations, which will result in an 
accurate contractual depiction of each party’s wants and needs 
under the agreement.118 Furthermore, parties to gestational 
carrier agreements are often from different states, which 
necessitates that a trained legal professional research the laws of 
both states in order to draft agreements that comply with the 
 
 113 Id. 
 114 CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 19, at 213–14 (explaining that gestational surrogacy 
agreements are often treated more liberally than traditional surrogacy arrangements).  
 115 See Rosenkranz, supra note 112, at 2110 (noting that the Defense of Marriage Act 
provided a definition for the term “marriage” which only identified a union between a man 
and a woman as a marriage, giving rise to significant debate and controversy).  
 116 See Kerian, supra note 22, at 151–52 (discussing whether women are truly 
harmed by participating in surrogacy arrangements); Paula M. Barbaruolo, The Public 
Policy Considerations of Surrogate Motherhood Contracts: An Analysis of Three 
Jurisdictions, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39, 72–73 (1993); Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A 
Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221, 
1234 (1997).  
 117 See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 
146 n.24 (citing United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942), which 
characterizes duress as “feebleness on one side, overpowering strength on the other”).  
 118 Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the Realities of the Contracting Process—An 
Essential Step to Achieve Justice in Contract Enforcement, 12 DEL. L. REV. 95, 103 (2011).  
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laws of all states that are involved.119 For all of these reasons, 
states should implement a statutory provision similar to 
California’s, requiring parties to be represented by independent 
legal counsel before entering into gestational carrier agreements.  
With regard to contract completion and how that relates to 
the overall timeline for gestational surrogacy, states should 
require that parties complete the written agreements before 
beginning any medical procedures. By requiring that parties 
complete their contract before beginning medical procedures, 
states can better ensure that parties will memorialize and agree 
upon their respective obligations and responsibilities before a 
child is conceived.120 This will eliminate situations where parties 
engage in litigation to determine parental rights and legal 
responsibilities after the child is born. By creating valid 
agreements before the medical processes begin, the best interests 
of the child are served, as they will have valid, legal parents from 
the moment they are born.121  
With regard to the financial aspects of gestational surrogacy, 
states should also include statutory regulations for how money is 
to be handled during the gestational carrier process. The cost to 
intended parents for one child born via gestational surrogacy is 
often around $100,000.122 When using a surrogacy agency to 
facilitate the process, the cost can be even higher.123 Surrogacy 
agencies usually require that any funds used for the surrogacy 
process go through their agency, which means intended parents 
are entrusting the agency with tens of thousands of dollars.124 By 
regulating the financial aspects of surrogacy agreements and 
providing procedures regarding how funds should be handled 
through state law, state legislation can help protect intended 
parents against fraud. 
States should also enact initial legislation or amend their 
current laws to include a provision that gestational carrier 
 
 119 Debra E. Guston & William S. Singer, A Well-Planned Family: How LGBT People 
Don’t Have Children by Accident, N.J. LAW. MAG., June 2013, at 25, 28.  
 120 See Hakes, supra note 118, at 101, 103.  
 121 Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended 
Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 267 (2011). 
 122 Susan Donaldson James, Infertile Americans Go to India for Gestational 
Surrogates, ABC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/infertile-americans-
india-gestational-surrogates/story?id=20808125.  
 123 When utilizing the services of a large surrogacy agency, the price can often be as 
much as $120,000. See Mike Anderson, Surrogacy Financing: How to Afford That $60K 
Price Tag, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-
money/2013/10/21/surrogacy-financing-how-to-afford-that-60k-price-tag.  
 124 See What to Expect when Working with a Surrogacy Agency, REPROD. 
POSSIBILITIES, http://www.reproductivepossibilities.com/parents_expect.cfm (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2015) (noting that this particular surrogacy agency requires the intended parents 
to put all funds into an escrow account).  
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agreements are presumptively valid. Without this presumption, 
both parties are harmed because the enforceability of the 
contract is in question.125 A presumption of validity provides both 
parties with an understanding that the agreement will be carried 
through, and this certainty provides legitimacy to the process as 
a whole.126 Furthermore, by providing that gestational carrier 
agreements are presumptively valid, doctors, hospitals, and 
clinics are protected from potential liability. If a gestational 
carrier agreement is completed, signed, and notarized, medical 
professionals know that they are legally permitted to act on the 
parties’ wishes and that they will not be subject to liability for 
allowing the intended parents to make medical decisions 
pursuant to the agreement.127  
Additionally, clearer and more complete regulation of 
gestational carrier contracts will help keep costs down for 
intended parents because increased predictability will lead to 
less litigation and lower attorneys’ fees.128 This will help reduce 
the number of couples who cannot utilize gestational surrogates 
because of the prohibitively high cost of these arrangements.129 
Therefore, states should draft their gestational surrogacy laws in 
the interest of judicial efficiency because the overall impact these 
arrangements have on courts will be lower if state statutes 
provide greater predictability. Greater certainty with regard to 
these contracts will also allow more infertile couples to 
confidently utilize the services of gestational carriers.  
IV. STRIKING THE PERFECT BALANCE: HOW MUCH SPECIFICITY IS 
TOO MUCH?  
While this Comment supports the statutory approach taken 
by the California legislature, it should be noted that some states 
have very comprehensive and even more specific gestational 
surrogacy statutes that provide an even greater level of detail 
than California’s. Illinois, for example, has statutes that provide 
for how a married surrogate’s husband is to be included in the 
 
 125 Posner, supra note 16, at 23.  
 126 See Christine Metteer Lorillard, Informed Choices and Uniform 
Decisions: Adopting the ABA’s Self-Enforcing Administrative Model to Ensure Successful 
Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 237, 255 (2010) (arguing that 
certainty in contracting is essential because “[a]n uncertain outcome makes the 
[gestational carrier] contract less valuable to both parties”).  
 127 Alyssa James, Note, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements: Why Indiana Should 
Honor Them and What Physicians Should Know Until They Do, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
175, 208 (2013).  
 128 Michelle Ford, Note, Gestational Surrogacy Is Not Adultery: Fighting Against 
Religious Opposition to Procreate, 10 BARRY L. REV. 81, 97 (2008).  
 129 Id. 
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contract,130 the right of the surrogate to use a physician of her 
choosing,131 and requirements for a woman to even become a 
surrogate in the first place.132 However, this statutory scheme is 
not without its deficiencies. Illinois’s statute has effectively 
removed the judiciary from the surrogacy process entirely, 
making it possible for intended parents to establish their 
parentage without a court order.133 This opens the door for legal 
issues when intended parents who travel to Illinois to utilize a 
surrogate return home to their own state, which may or may not 
have a favorable view of surrogacy. Authorities may question the 
intended parent’s legal custody of their child and, if asked to 
produce documentation of their parentage, they will not have a 
court order identifying themselves as the child’s legal guardians. 
As this area of the law develops, it will be important for 
legislatures and advocates alike to consider the practical 
implications of statutory schemes, whether they provide minimal 
or specific amounts of detail.  
CONCLUSION 
By adopting a statutory model similar to California’s, states 
can better regulate and monitor gestational surrogacy 
arrangements. Although Connecticut has created a workable 
statutory framework to enforce gestational surrogacy 
agreements, more can be done to provide a greater level of 
certainty and predictability for those who are parties to these 
contracts. Surrogacy agreements are here to stay, and states 
should not take a minimalist approach to the regulation of these 
complex contracts. In working towards creating statutory 
provisions with predictable practical implications, legislatures 
 
 130 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(c)(2) (2014) (“A gestational surrogacy contract shall 
provide for[,] . . . if the gestational surrogate is married, the express agreement of her 
husband to: (i) undertake the obligations imposed on the gestational surrogate pursuant 
to the terms of the gestational surrogacy contract; [and] (ii) surrender custody of the child 
to the intended parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child.”). 
 131 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(c)(3) (“A gestational surrogacy contract shall 
provide for . . . the right of the gestational surrogate to utilize the services of a physician 
of her choosing, after consultation with the intended parents, to provide her care during 
the pregnancy.”). 
 132 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20. To be eligible to be a gestational carrier under this 
statute, a woman must be at least twenty-one years old, have given birth to at least one 
child, completed a medical and mental health evaluation, undergone legal consultation 
regarding the terms and potential consequences of the contract, and obtained a health 
insurance policy that will cover major medical expenses throughout the intended 
pregnancy and for eight weeks after the birth of the child. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(a). 
 133 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/35. Under this statutory scheme, “a parent-child 
relationship shall be established prior to the birth of a child born through gestational 
surrogacy if . . . the attorneys representing both the gestational surrogate and the 
intended parent or parents certify that the parties entered into a gestational surrogacy 
contract intended to satisfy the requirements” of the Act. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/35(a). 
Do Not Delete 2/15/2015 7:40 PM 
576 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:2 
will be one step closer towards creating a more uniform 
state-statutory approach in regulating surrogacy. By including 
more specific and comprehensive regulations of the contents of 
gestational carrier contracts and the surrogacy process itself, 
states can better provide intended parents with certainty and 
assurance that they will be recognized as the legal parents of 
their children born through a gestational surrogate.  
 
